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Similarities between aspects of spatial cognition and language are examined 
in the domains of type of computations (recursive, categorial), type of 
information used (descriptive and geometric), update procedures for the 
relevant context representations, and neuro-cognitive aspects (the role of the 
hippocampus). Striking similarities observed, and the fact that spatial 
cognitive capacities of all vertebrates are of approximately the same nature 
and complexity, narrow down the set of possible distinctive properties of 
the human cognition and the language faculty in the comparative cognition 
perspective . It is proposed that these properties are: (A) domain-general use 
of the otherwise similar computational capacities, (B) serialization of the 
computations of descriptive and geometric means of reference, and (C) 
increased importance of the update of mental representations by a group 
rather than just an individual. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This article compares two cognitive domains: spatial cognition and natural 
language. While the former is present in a quite sophisticated form at least in all 
vertebrates, and a number of other species, the latter is an exclusive characteristic 
of humans. From the aspect of evolution, this means that spatial cognition has 
been there in the animal world for a very long time, while language is a relatively 
new development. A look at some interesting similarities and differences 
between these two capacities may contribute to the theories of each of them. Yet, 
more can be revealed about a newer capacity by looking at an older one, than 
about an older capacity by looking at the one that is more recent. The interest of 
this article is set in this more informative direction: It aims at learning about 
language (its setting among other capacities, its origins, its structures) by 
comparing it to the spatial cognition capacity, more precisely to one of its 
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components: cognitive maps. 
 The article is organized as follows. In sections 2 and 3, I briefly outline the 
major aspects of spatial cognition and language, respectively, i.e. those that 
compare in the most insightful way from the perspective of the article. Section 4 
points to the relevant similarities, and section 5 presents and discusses some 
differences. In section 6, I discuss the results of the comparison, especially 
concentrating on the possibility that language has evolved from the spatial 
cognition capacity, with the crucial step being an extension of the spatial 
computation to a domain-general use. Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. Cognitive Maps 
 
The field of spatial cognition presents one of the better-explored domains of the 
cognitive neuroscience. It has acquired a significant body of knowledge, which 
establishes quite precise links between the functional, representational and 
neurological aspects of the domain. Experimental work on a wide variety of 
species has resulted in a broadly accepted functional architecture of spatial 
cognition, and in precise linking of some of these functions to particular brain 
areas. One of the central fields of the theory of spatial cognition is concerned with 
cognitive maps — a component that is prominent in spatial cognition of all 
vertebrates, including humans (as opposed, for instance, to dead reckoning or the 
so-called compass mechanisms). I briefly present those among the core elements 
of the theory of cognitive maps that are of particular interest for this contribution. 
 Cognitive maps represent territories and involve two main types of 
information: the map of the territory, involving places, paths between them and 
their geometric configurations (spatial cues), and descriptions (object-specific 
cues) of each of the places involved, expressed in terms of a number of associated 
features (Vallortigara, Zanforlin & Pasti 1990, Vallortigara, Pagni & Sovrano 
2004).1 A third emerging type of information is the geometric information about a 
place, i.e. the set of relations of a place with other places and the set of 
geometrically relevant properties of a place (length, height, shape): This type 
involves geometric information, but presents part of the description of a 
particular place. Together, they form the representation of the spatial context. 
 For instance, consider the inside of a box with a rectangular base, painted 
white, with one red corner in which there is a small piece of meat. A rat, placed 
in this box, represents this territory as a spatial context. The context 
representation involves a map with a number of places: two long walls, two short 
walls, the flour, the ceiling, two corners with a long wall to the left and a short 
                                                
    1 In this article, I group together the pure geometric cues and the landmark cues, since they 
both involve the component of a spatial structure, absent in pure descriptions. I am aware of 
the facts that imply that the two grouped types of cues are different and should be treated 
apart, but for the purposes of the contribution, their grouping does not have important 
consequences and is a handy simplification. In fact, it would even strengthen the point 
because (i) even in language there are global geometric cues (topic, focus, familiar) and the 
more local ones, relative to some prominent referents (e.g., proximity vs. distance in 
demonstratives and other elements) and (ii) introduction of one more category further 
stresses the categorical nature of spatial cognition, as a parallel with language. 
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one to the right, one of which with the additional properties of being red, 
emitting a smell of an edible thing and containing an object, and two corners 
with a long wall to the right and a short one to the left, distinguished by whether 
they have the ‘red edible’ corner to the left or to the right. As abundantly 
confirmed by experiments, ignoring the red color and the piece of meat, we get 
two pairs of indistinguishable walls and two pairs of indistinguishable corners. 
 The representation of a spatial context can be updated by new information 
acquired through a sensory input. It has been argued that this process goes via 
the match–mismatch procedure (Mizumori, Ragozzino & Cooper 2000), which 
can be briefly sketched as follows. At any point, the animal has a spatial context 
representation, constructed as a set of expectations for the territory it is located 
in. The sensory input is continuously matched with this set of expectations, 
leading to the preservation of the matched and correction of the non-matched 
expectations. The spatial context representation is thus subject to a constant 
update. In the given example, removing the animal from the box, moving the 
piece of meat to a neighboring corner and then bringing the animal back into the 
box would result in the update of its spatial context representation by specifying 
that the properties of being red and of having an edible object are now 
distributed over two corners, and the corner with the latter property now has a 
long wall to its right and a short one to its left, while the rest of the context stayed 
the same. 
 Finally, the spatial context representation serves as a background for 
different behavioral actions, such as movement, eating, drinking, removing 
obstacles, etc. These actions depend on motivational aspects, and most of them 
introduce the need for an update of the spatial context representation. This 
update may involve the integration of a path that the subject is moving on, the 
change of the subject’s location in the map or the change of features of some 
place in the map (after the food is eaten, the place where it used to be loses the 
feature of containing an edible object). 
 Animals can compute complex structures from a spatial context represen-
tation, among which most prominently paths. Paths involve the source, direction 
and goal, but also possibly a number of places via which they reach the goal, and 
which may serve as intermediate cues for navigation while moving along the 
paths. During movement, the path needs to be regularly recomputed, updating 
the position of the subject on the path, and hence also on the map. Note that this 
involves computation of paths and places (and their features), and as such is a 
different mechanism from dead reckoning (vector-based computation of the 
position of a moving animal with respect to the starting position), although dead 
reckoning may be involved in the computation of paths. 
 When two places have the same description in terms of non-geometric 
features, their position relative to some other, unambiguously defined place may 
serve as the distinctive feature (as with the pair of corners without meat above). 
This implies that spatial computation involves hierarchical structures of the type 
‘[THE_SHELTER [BETWEEN [THE_TREE AND THE_ROCK [ALONG [THE_WATER [BEHIND 
[THE_HILL]]]]]]]’. It takes a hierarchical structure to represent one place as 
specified by a description that involves another place (and its description). 
 One of the major roles in the computations producing the discussed 
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representations, and dealing with their update and use in other capacities, is 
played by the hippocampus, a brain area that can be identified in a broad range 
of animal species. There is evidence that this is where the spatial context 
representation and its update are handled (Nadel, Willner & Kurz 1985, 
Anagnostaras, Gale & Fanselow 2001). In addition, the hippocampus appears to 
have a role in the coordination between this representation and the peripheral 
modules: the sensory input, the motivational aspects, and the behavioral actions 
(Jakab & Leranth 1995, Markus et al. 1995, Wood et al. 2000). This means that 
among other things, the hippocampus is responsible for matching the sensory 
input with the spatial context representation, and for selecting parts of the spatial 
context representation to be matched with motivational aspects and patterns of 
behavioral actions. In other words, (i) it pairs the sensory input with a segment 
from the spatial context representation, where the latter can be seen as the 
interpretation of the former, and (ii) triggered by different motivational aspects, 
it matches segments of the spatial context representation with the adequate 
patterns of behavioral actions, usually realized by the motoric system. 
 
 
3. Language 
 
Natural language grammar is traditionally defined as the system that maps 
between the meaning and its physical carrier. The physical carrier is produced by 
the motoric system and perceived by the sensory system, while the meaning is 
taken to be some mental representation, directly or indirectly related to the real 
world. Arsenijević & Hinzen (2007) argue that there is no separate level of 
representation reserved for the meanings of linguistic expressions. Syntax is the 
specification of the compositional structure of the complex concept that we 
recognize as the intuition about the meaning of an expression. And syntax 
directly interfaces the discourse, and drives the integration of the expression, 
securing that the concepts associated to the terminal lexical units are integrated 
in the proper discourse domain and in the proper relation with respect to other 
such concepts in the expression. To sum up, semantics, as the intuition about the 
concepts derived by linguistic expressions, relates to two empirical domains: the 
syntactic structure that derives these concepts, and the effects of the integration 
of the expression into the discourse.  
 The use of language always involves a discourse: the representation of the 
aggregate body of information relevant for the current language use. This 
information includes contributions of the explicit linguistic expressions uttered 
so far in the communication situation, the immediately relevant presupposed 
material, and the directly relevant parts of the non-linguistic sensory input (the 
communication situation). The discourse consists of referents, their descriptions 
in terms of different predicates, and discourse functions (topic, focus). Discourse 
functions mark the position of a referent within the internal organization of the 
discourse — is it within the speaker’s, the hearer’s or some remote domain, is it 
part of the (recent) old information or not, is it a member of some relevant set, 
etc. The discourse also involves paths: A remote referent can be reached via the 
more proximal ones: an expression like the dog of my friend’s sister would be used 
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if the speaker’s friend in question is more topical in the discourse than the 
friend’s sister, and the friend’s sister is more topical than the friend’s sister’s dog, 
hence deriving the path among referents: the friend – the sister – the dog. 
 The discourse can be updated from the sensory input. If the discourse 
involves some relevant bit of information, which is denied, or corrected, by some 
expression uttered within this discourse, the discourse gets updated. Even if a bit 
of information became part of the discourse by the contribution of an earlier 
linguistic expression within the same communication situation, it can be denied 
or corrected (e.g., someone realizes that what he said a minute ago was wrong). 
This means that the discourse consists of expectations, which can be modified by 
a strong enough sensory input.  
 The discourse can trigger certain behavioral actions, falling into two 
important classes. The first is the production of a linguistic expression: an action 
effecting in yet another contribution to the discourse. This is a consequence of the 
fact that the discourse is usually shared, and those sharing it normally want to 
enrich it. A direct contribution to the discourse is achieved by producing a 
physical entity that presents a sensory input for the other persons sharing the 
discourse, thus making them update their discourse representations with the 
relevant material. The second class is simpler: Some updates in the discourse 
may introduce a direct instruction for the subject to take a certain behavioral 
action, assuming that a sufficient motivational support is provided (like the 
sentence Leave me alone!). These updates are referred to as speech acts. 
 In the domain of pure sensory input, linguistic expressions, serving as one 
of the possible sensory inputs leading to the discourse update, present (sets of 
parallel) linear strings (the–dog–of–my–friend’s–sister). They have to be assigned 
hierarchical structures on their way to the discourse: [the dog [of [my friend’s] 
sister]]. The hierarchical structures mediating the discourse update fall in the 
research domain of syntax. The choice of the hierarchical structure to be matched 
with a linear string is usually restricted by the relatively restricted expectations in 
the discourse. The proper one among them is in the default case uniquely 
determined by two types of information: the sequencing of units forming the 
linear string, their ordering, and their categorical and selectional properties 
memorized in the lexicon.2 
 It has been shown that in language comprehension, hippocampus plays a 
central role in the syntactic integration. Recording of Event-Related Potentials 
(ERP) shows that syntactically incorrect sentences elicit a negative deflection of 
500–800 ms in this brain area (Meyer et al. 2005). This does not necessarily imply 
that hippocampus is directly involved in the processing of the syntactic structure 
(see Opitz & Friederici 2003 for arguments that the rule-based aspects of 
grammar are computed by other centers). It does mean, however, that the 
hippocampus plays a role in the discourse integration, and that this role is 
sensitive to whether the expression that is being integrated is assigned a valid 
syntactic structure or not. The special activity of the hippocampus may, for 
                                                
    2 The phonetic string is in fact phonologically computed as not linear but hierarchical, with a 
relatively shallow hierarchical structure (compared to that of syntax, to which it imperfectly 
matches), but since this article concentrates on the structures with direct semantic effects, 
the issue is slightly simplified. 
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instance, be related to trying to use the information from the discourse to identify 
the most likely update — in the lack of precise information provided by syntax, 
but I refrain from going into speculations of this kind. 
 
 
4. Parallels 
 
This section presents some striking similarities between cognitive maps and the 
faculty of language, concerning their general architectures and the core structural 
properties of the computational mechanisms behind them.  
 Let us consider first the general architecture of the two capacities. 
Grammar, the core component of the faculty of language, has for more than a 
century been defined as a system that maps between physical objects (carriers of 
messages) and meanings (contents of messages). In the language use perspective, 
this renders three domains:   
(A) the mental representations corresponding to the meaning; 
(B) language production, as one aspect of the physical carrier pole; 
(C) language perception as its other aspect.  
Grammar maps from the perceived linguistic material to meanings, and from 
meanings to the behavioral patterns engaged in the production of a message by 
speaking, signing or writing (or in other possible ways). Moreover, it has been 
argued that the notion of meaning should be dispensed with, in favor of a more 
precise model, in which it resolves into the lexical and syntactic material of a 
linguistic expression on the one hand, and the effects of the integration of the 
expression into the relevant discourse (Arsenijević & Hinzen 2007, Hagoort & 
van Berkum 2007). This gets us to the following picture: There is a computational 
module, grammar (plus lexicon), which drives the integration of the relevant 
type of sensory input into a special mental representation (the discourse) and 
triggers the adequate patterns of behavioral actions for the retrieved segments 
from the mental representation. The behavioral actions are sensitive to 
communicational and other motivations, and may be of two types: (i) language 
production and actions affecting the immediate context of communication and 
(ii) other behavioral actions coming as a response to the changes in the discourse. 
As mentioned above in section 3, the hippocampus has a central role in the 
coordination between the discourse and the sensory aspects of language, 
especially in the process of discourse integration of new material.  
 With a high degree of parallelism, the standard model of spatial cognition 
involves coordination between a mental representation (the spatial context 
representation), the relevant sensory input and the adequate behavioral patterns 
(Cheng & Newcombe 2005). The context is viewed as the continuously present 
background stimuli, but it also includes internal aspects such as plans, goals, 
motivation, types of behavioral activities involved (Markus et al. 1995). The 
sensory input that does not match the relevant segment of the spatial context 
representation gets integrated, leading to an update of the spatial context 
representation (Mizumori, Ragozzino & Cooper 2000). Patterns of behavioral 
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actions involve two types of motivation: the general curiosity about the spatial 
environment and the independent, non-spatial motivations such as hunger, 
thirst, fear, etc. (Voicu & Schmajuk 2001). They can be divided into behavioral 
actions with an immediate controlled effect on the spatial context (removing an 
obstacle, storing food in some place, changing the landscape by, e.g., digging) 
and those without such effects. As mentioned above in section 2, the coordination 
between the sensory input, the spatial context representation and the behavioral 
actions is shown to involve a significant role played by the hippocampus.3 
 The two mechanisms of update are characterized by one important 
difference: The update of a cognitive map by the sensory input is unconditional, 
while the update of the context representation by the linguistic input is not — the 
subject may as well decide to discard it if in conflict with some well-established 
old part of the representation (in effect similar like bees do it in the experiment 
described below on this page4). The choice that humans have in this respect can 
be attributed to their rich theory of mind. Humans can deal with a number of 
context representations, possibly embedded in one another. When talking to Bill, 
apart from her own immediate world-knowledge, Sue also deals with a 
representation of a context shared with Bill, and a representation of the context 
that she assigns only to Bill (including, e.g., points that they know they view 
differently). Any proposition contributed by Bill can be used to update any one 
of these representations, a combination of two, or all three of them. Even if Sue 
thinks that Bill is lying, she has to update the shared representation in some way. 
Hence, the necessity of update is common for the two capacities, but the 
linguistic update is characterized by the multiple possible target representations. 
 One of the phenomena most frequently identified as a characteristic 
property of language is the capacity of reference. By use of language, humans can 
talk about a particular object in reality, and assign it certain relevant properties, 
even when this object is out of the reach of any of their senses (‘displaced 
reference’). A counterpart of this capacity can be identified in the domain of 
spatial cognition, in a number of different examples. For instance, the so-called 
homing species can compute paths leading to a particular location even when 
this location is far out of the reach of their (visual, olfactive, and other) senses. 
Examples like this allow for the possibility that the animal does not operate over 
a representation of the place of homing, but instinctively computes some 
complex paths that bring it to a territory where it can use other navigation 
mechanisms.5 However, an experiment with bees, referred to in Gallistel (in 
                                                
    3 The parallels outlined do not entail, of course, that the two capacities do not also have 
computational components specific for each of them, shared with other capacities, or 
engaged by spillover when the centers engaged are overloaded. In any case, it is beyond the 
goal of this contribution to make more concrete claims about the neurological aspects of the 
parallel. Also, the architectures as presented might reflect a more general architecture of any 
module involving sensory input, and not only between cognitive maps and language, but 
other similarities point to a tighter parallel between the two capacities discussed. 
    4 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to me. 
    5 But even in this case, the difference assumed between the human awareness of a place and 
the animal’s instinctive mechanical computation of certain geometrical and other properties 
is an empty one. Ultimately, our awareness of a place, or other referent, also has to be 
represented in terms of neuro-cognitive mechanisms. 
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press), proves that animals can indeed compute, using cognitive maps, 
information involving a particular remote place, about which they are currently 
receiving no sensory input. In the experiment, an artificial source of food, new in 
the territory, moved in three steps: from a flower field to the water, and to 
another flower field. Different groups of foragers visited each of the three places, 
and then went back to inform the community about the source of food. Their 
dance only had effect when they were informing about the first and the third 
step, i.e. when the source was in places already known as possible locations of 
sources of food. When informing about the source on the water, the bees ignored 
the dance. This shows not only that bees have representations of remote places, 
but also that they are able to evaluate information as true (or useful, trusted) or 
false (or useless). Similarly, the ability of animals to create new paths within the 
territory, such as yet unexplored shortcuts (Taylor, Naylor & Chechile 1999), 
implies that they have a representation of the place presenting the goal of the 
path. This all suggests that the core of computation of cognitive maps at least in 
some species involves a counterpart of reference: animals can compute the 
representation of a certain place even when it is absent from their immediate 
perceptive input. The fact that humans can perform more complex activities with 
respect to reference may be a consequence of the absence of restriction of the 
computation of reference to a small number of domains (e.g., space, social 
relations) and of the higher processing and memory human capacities of 
computation of the context and of referents. To the exclusion of domain 
generality and memory and processing capacities, the essential ingredients seem 
to be shared between a number of species.  
 The problem with reference is that there is no standard theory of it, and 
hence it is difficult to make a deeper comparison between linguistic reference in 
humans and that found in spatial cognition in a wider variety of species. At least 
at the descriptive level, however, some more substantial parallels can be made. 
 In language, referential expressions usually involve two ingredients. One is 
a specification of a discourse domain, and of a discourse function that the 
intended referent has in that domain, and it is achieved by different tools which 
include sentence typing, discourse function marking, and demonstrative 
pronouns. The other ingredient is a description, a complex concept built by a 
composition of a number of simpler ones. The description should be restrictive 
enough to reduce the number of possible candidates within the relevant 
discourse domain to one. The two ingredients act as the address and the name of 
the addressee: The discourse domain and the discourse function specify the city 
and the street, while the description singles out the addressee among the 
candidates with the same address. As an illustration, consider the passage in (1), 
and especially the underlined nominal expression. 
 
(1)  Two girls went to the hairdresser. One of the girls was extremely tall. The 
hairdresser told the tall girl to come another day…  
 
Its intonation, position within the sentence, and the definite article used suggest 
that the expression refers to an old, topical referent, part of the ongoing discourse 
of the preceding two sentences. The words tall and girl specify two properties, i.e. 
From Spatial Cognition to Language 
 
11 
two concepts; the syntax of the expression specifies that the two properties 
should be intersected, producing a more restrictive interpretation. This 
interpretation is the description of the referent — it is tall and girl at the same 
time (for sake of simplicity, I ignore the meanings of singularity and countability, 
also contributed by the expression). The discourse domain and the discourse 
function reduce the possible candidates to the hairdresser and the two girls. The 
description singles out the intended referent among the candidates, in this case 
the tall girl. Note that girl only would not be enough (hence the expression the 
girl, instead of the underlined the tall girl, would not be salient for the context). 
 In cognitive maps, as briefly outlined in section 2, two types of information 
are used: the geometric information about a place, specifying its location relative 
to different elements of the spatial context representation, and the descriptive 
information, specifying some properties that characterize the relevant place. 
Interestingly enough, it seems that animals with sophisticated spatial cognition, 
apart from humans, acquire the two types of information independently of each 
other, and do not combine them, but have to choose only one of them for every 
attempt to locate a particular place (and pick a pattern of a behavioral action); cf. 
Wang & Spelke (2002), Pearce et al. (2006). Apart from this aspect, which is 
discussed in section 5, there is a strong parallelism with language: Both cognitive 
maps and language use two types of information in locating a referent. One type 
locates the referent relative to the organization of the mental representation of the 
relevant context (the spatial context representation or the discourse 
representation), and the other involves features, i.e. non-geometric concepts, to 
specify a restriction that singles out the relevant referent from the set of suitable 
candidates. The size of the context representation, the possibility for it to involve 
domains currently inaccessible to the senses of the individual (including the 
abstract ones), and other mostly quantitative features of the particular system 
may lead to dramatic differences in their performance, but the ontological 
similarity remains a fact. 
 The parallel between cognitive maps and language related to the use of 
geometric and descriptive information goes even deeper. It appears that in 
familiar spatial environments (i.e. contexts), in a vast majority of (vertebrate) 
species, geometric cues are preferred to the descriptive ones (Gibson & Shettle-
worth 2003). This is explained by the fact that geometric cues are less likely to 
vary over time, compared to the visual, auditive, or other descriptive cues. For 
instance, a colorful flower may close during the day, or change its angle with the 
ground, but its location will stay the same. In new environments, however, 
descriptive cues are more important than the geometric ones. In fact, in a new 
spatial environment, geometric relations are still to be established by exploration 
— which is most naturally performed by using the more readily perceived 
descriptive cues.  
 In language, within an old discourse, the preferred way of locating its 
referents is through (repeated) personal and demonstrative pronouns, elements 
using geometric features of locality and proximity, rather than through repeated 
descriptions. Consider the example in (2), where pronominal elements are used 
in the reply in B, and descriptions in B’. 
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(2)  A:  My friend Mary’s math teacher wants her to be more active. 
 B:  Did he tell her what exactly he meant by that? 
B’:   # Did (your friend Mary’s) math teacher tell (your) friend Mary what 
exactly (your friend Mary’s) math teacher meant by telling your 
friend Mary that your friend Mary’s math teacher wants your friend 
Mary to be more active? 
 
It is a standard view in syntax and semantics that pronominal elements, 
including demonstratives, are directly related to the functional projection of the 
determiner, which specifies the features related to specificity and definiteness, 
both linked to the organization of the discourse (e.g., Kayne 2002). Moreover, 
demonstratives often involve the component of distance vs. proximity (this vs. 
that), which is in most cases related to the discourse organization and the abstract 
vicinity of the referent to the speaker or to the thematic background of the 
expression (Jayaseelan & Hariprasad 2001).6 This shows that language also 
prefers the use of geometric features in familiar discourses, i.e. for discourse-
familiar referents. New discourses, new referents, and new choices among old 
groups of referents are better handled by the use of descriptions. This is why the 
subject of (2A), my friend Mary’s math teacher, is used, as an expression involving a 
description: The referent has probably not appeared in the immediately pre-
ceding discourse, and therefore has not yet been assigned ‘discourse-geometric’ 
properties in the relevant discourse domain. 
 Another characteristic property of natural language grammar is that it 
crucially relies on a set of categories, which can embed in one another under 
certain structural restrictions, referred to by a number of different terms: 
subcategorization, selection, projection, etc. So, for instance, the category verb 
(VP in syntax) can embed immediately under the category tense (TP) — such as 
in [TP –ed [VP walk]] — to give the interpretation of the location of the eventuality 
denoted by the verb in the past with respect to some reference time and/or with 
respect to the speech time (the tense operates over the meaning of the verb).7 
However, TP cannot embed immediately under VP ([VP walk [TP –ed]]), to give, for 
instance, the interpretation of a past that has the property of walking, perhaps as 
opposed to running or flying (i.e. where the meaning of the verb operates over 
the tense). Even more importantly, TP cannot embed immediately under TP, nor 
can VP embed immediately under VP (two verbs can compose, but this is either a 
case of coordination or a more complex hierarchical structure than immediate 
embedding). All these embeddings become possible when mediated by other 
categories, and hence not immediate: The restrictions are local and target imme-
                                                
    6 Imagine the following reply to (2A), in which the interlocutor switches to another world: 
 
  (i)  B’’: In a fairytale, he’d be her evil stepmother. 
 
The dynamics of the use of pronouns and the features distal and proximal indicates that 
they are sensitive to a geometry independent of any particular world that belongs to the 
discourse, unless some particular worlds are involved in specifying the property that singles 
out the referent from the relevant set of alternatives.  
    7 The lexicalization of this structure as walked is an issue of morphology and phonology, it is 
not a source of controversies, and is not interesting for the current discussion. 
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diate embedding only. 
 Something very similar to this can be found in the domain of cognitive 
maps. As outlined in section 2, there are two major types of spatial objects: places 
and paths. These make two different categories. Moreover, it appears that paths 
are a more complex category, the definition of which may immediately involve 
places (paths must go from places, to places and/or via places, while places can 
be specified by descriptions that do not involve paths), such as, for example,  
[PATH goal [PLACE home]]. Places are defined based on the geometric properties of 
their position with respect to the territory and other places on it, especially 
landmarks, and based on the properties they have, such as color, smell, or shape 
(i.e. descriptive features). Paths are dynamically computed in every individual 
situation, because they directly depend on the current position of the subject, and 
the way in which it is changing. They are dynamic interpretations of geometric 
properties, actual in the respective situation. There are also other possible 
categories, such as landmarks (a subcategory of places) or geometrical structures, 
an issue I do not dwell on in this article because the two categories above suffice 
for the aimed argument: That categories, with the same type of embedding, and 
restrictions over the embedding are an important property of cognitive maps as 
well as of the language faculty. 
 The distinction between descriptive and geometrical features is another 
level of categorization. While animals seem to compute these two categories 
separately, each of them still embeds in the category of places: Places are 
determined by their descriptions and/or by their geometrical positions. Hence 
we get an even deeper hierarchical structure: [PATH goal [PLACE [DESCRIPTION home]]]. 
Moreover, if the description involves an additional feature specified with respect 
to another place, a real recursive embedding takes place; for the water near the 
home, [PATH goal [PLACE [DESCRIPTION water, near [PLACE [DESCRIPTION home]]]]]], for 
example. Embedding of this kind is quite restricted: computation of cognitive 
maps probably can only handle structures with at most one round of embedding 
(one place described in term of one other place). Yet, this restriction may be 
imposed by the memory capacities, or by economy principles, rather than by the 
computational capacity, which is then genuinely recursive. If it is correct that the 
computation of cognitive maps involves structures with recursive embedding, 
this presents recursive computations as a much older development in the course 
of evolution than argued by Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch (2002). 
 It is possible to speculate in the direction of establishing parallels between 
places in cognitive maps and referents of nominal expressions in language on the 
one hand, and between paths in cognitive maps and eventualities in language. 
Both members of the former pair correspond to geometric points, and both 
members of the latter pair have linear structures. Moreover, both paths and 
eventualities include places and objects, respectively, as important defining 
elements in their structures. Without a neuro-cognitive, or at least a deeper cogni-
tive support, this line of thinking remains in the domain of speculations. 
 In talking about the way language establishes reference, referents were dis-
cussed as located within discourses, but also within parts of discourses, discourse 
domains, which present the immediate thematic, temporal and spatial vicinity of 
the most prominent topical referents in a particular segment of the text. This im-
B. Arsenijević 
 
14 
plies a hierarchical organization of the discourse, i.e. its division into domains, 
which are smaller and hence easier for retrieval and for locating referents in 
them. The very same has been argued to hold for cognitive maps: A territory is 
always divided into sub-territories, which may be further divided, in order to 
make the retrieval procedure faster and simpler (Schmajuk & Voicu 2006). 
 Finally, as presented in sections 2 and 3, in the computation of both cogni-
tive maps and language, an important role is played by the hippocampus. In fact, 
some proposed descriptions of this role in the spatial domain are equally well 
applicable to its linguistic aspects. One of them defines the activity of the 
hippocampus as directly handling a coding of locations, events, behavioral 
strategies and their mutual relations into the context representation (Aggleton & 
Brown 1999). This could well serve as a description of the effects of discourse 
integration, if locations are taken to cover all referents, and the relevant context 
representation is taken to be the discourse. This touches on the important 
question of language-specific cognitive elements, supporting the view that most 
of the components of the language faculty are rather general and apply in other 
capacities as well. Such is the case with the procedures that integrate new 
material to some context representation, be it the spatial context, the discourse, or 
some other relevant representation, or with those which, influenced by moti-
vational impulses, match segments of a context representation with behavioral 
strategies. 
 
 
5. Differences 
 
The major difference between natural language and spatial computation is that 
while in the latter only one individual integrates new information into the 
relevant mental representation, in the former the representation can be shared 
and updated by groups of individuals. In fact, the possibility that more than one 
individual shares the same discourse and participates in the process of its update 
is one of the properties of language that have influenced its current form the 
most, from the very existence of the phonology and phonetics (and hence the 
dual patterning of language), to a number of smaller differences at all levels at 
which spatial cognition and the language faculty can be compared, especially at 
those at which language involves an important role played by phonology.  
 Another interesting difference is briefly mentioned in section 4. While in 
language, descriptions and geometrical properties (i.e. those related to the 
organization of the discourse) appear as parts of one and the same unit of 
computation (a linguistic expression), in cognitive maps, these two types of 
information are separated and one unit of computation may consist of elements 
either only of the descriptive, or only of the geometrical nature. In fact, even in 
language, the two types of information are not really computed simultaneously. 
They appear strictly structurally segregated: The ‘lower’ structural domains are 
reserved for the descriptive content, while the ‘higher’ ones involve the 
discourse-related information (e.g., Rizzi 1997). This means that grammar 
performs serialized computations, where each unit of computation, a phase 
under the phase theory of syntactic computation (Chomsky 2001), consists of the 
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inner phase with the descriptive content, and the edge, whose contents are 
discourse-related (McNay 2006).  
 It is interesting that the acquisition of language in humans influences their 
spatial cognition. Some properties of the processing of cognitive maps, including 
the use of descriptive and geometric cues, undergo a drastic change around the 
age of six, which is also considered the critical period during which the 
individual rounds her acquisition of grammar (Hermer–Vazquez, Spelke & 
Katsnelson 1999). 
 A third difference, and the last one to be discussed in this section, concerns 
the domains of the two capacities. In the spatial computation, only spatial objects 
are categorized, all the other concepts falling in the category of ‘the rest’, i.e. of 
the material used only for descriptions. In natural language, referents are not 
restricted in any way; they do not even need counterparts in the real world: they 
can be abstract (as in: The suspicion caused jealousy.), non-existent (A unicorn fell in 
love with Godzilla.), or even impossible (square circles on solid liquids). This means 
that every concept can be used as a referent (jealousy, redness, distance) as well 
as (part of) a description. Referents are placed in an abstract space, the discourse, 
with its own organization that is only marginally influenced by the spatial 
relations in the real world. This makes the geometric properties of the discourse 
abstract and much more easily transformed than those of the (representation of) 
physical space. At the same time, it makes the process of updating and retrieving 
the context representation much more complex in language than in cognitive 
maps. One tool that language developed for this purpose is a richer set of 
categories. Instead of several categories that could be identified in cognitive 
maps, syntax disposes with several dozens of categories (at least according to the 
‘cartographic’ approach to syntax, see, e.g., Cinque 1999). 
 The result, at the surface, where functional effects of the cognitive systems 
are observed, is a significant asymmetry. Spatial cognition, the domain in which 
animals show a high level of reference-based abilities, produces and deals with 
(retrieves, updates, combines) a set of SPATIAL contexts and sub-contexts stored 
in the long-term memory, amounting to the set of relevant territories in the life of 
an individual. Language, present only in humans, and based on their domain-
general application of the recursive computational algorithms, produces and 
deals with a drastically larger set of discourses and discourse domains in the 
unified abstract macro-space of all the available concepts and all their (possible) 
compositions.8 
 A very important consequence of the domain-general application of 
recursive computation in humans is that they can not only embed (spatial) 
contexts in other (spatial) contexts, but also embed non-spatial contexts in non-
spatial objects. In such a way, a powerful theory of mind can be derived: The 
description of each object potentially involves a context, or a set of contexts (her 
knowledge, views, beliefs). This may be the explanation for the universality and 
important role in grammar of the feature of animacy. Animacy marks objects that 
                                                
    8 The possibility that humans only differ from animals in their domain-general use of 
recursive computations is mentioned in Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch (2002), although it is not 
the claim they are directly arguing for. 
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can have their own context representations, i.e. ‘points’ in the discourse where 
another discourse can be embedded. And this altogether enables a multiple up-
date, as the core of communication. While a unit of a spatial sensory input 
updates one spatial (sub-)context, a sentence in language may update a larger 
number of context representations, some of which can be embedded in the 
descriptions of referents of other contexts. Crucially, the context representation of 
one interlocutor contains representations of other interlocutors as objects, i.e. 
referents, and the description of these referents involve representations of their 
relevant context representations. Each of these embedded context representations 
is normally updated by each sentence uttered in the discourse, parallel to the 
update of the hierarchically highest context representation. On the surface, this 
looks like a group update: Each of the interlocutors represents a number of 
(sub-)contexts that have counterparts in all the other interlocutors, and all such 
sets of counterparts are updated in (nearly) the same way. Individuals of the 
group thus develop synchronized context-representations, which enable a 
synchronized functioning of the group. Apart from its cognitive and linguistic 
significance, this phenomenon plays an important role at the social level, which 
has probably been one of the ingredients in the selective pressure that pushed the 
evolution of language (Bickerton 1998). 
 
 
6. Discussion 
 
Similarities and differences between spatial cognition and language discussed in 
this article could be interpreted in three possible ways. One option is that the 
similarities observed are just a consequence of the methodological apparatus 
applied: Cognitive sciences deal with a set of general models, such as the division 
of different systems into computational and memory components. The fact that 
the same set of models can be fruitfully applied to different subjects of study 
does not guarantee that a deeper exploration would not uncover significant 
differences and require a modification of the models that would make them 
ontologically different from each other. This option presents a general danger for 
any theoretical work and hence will be ignored, leaving to the future research to 
prove it correct or wrong. 
 The second possibility is that the similarities are not more than that: 
(vague) similarities between two different systems. The weakest explanation 
would be that the similarities are accidental. A stronger one would be that they 
are a consequence of some general properties of cognition, i.e. of the neuronal 
systems in the brain, but that they still are disjoint systems. The strongest option 
under this interpretation is that the two systems share some components, for 
instance the computational module engaged in the retrieval and update, or the 
window to the long-term memory, and that this shared component is responsible 
for the shared properties between the two systems. This option agrees quite well 
with the neuro-cognitive data about the role of the hippocampus in both systems, 
as discussed in sections 2–4. 
 The third possibility is that the language faculty has evolved from the 
spatial cognition capacity. This is the strongest, and hence the theoretically most 
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interesting interpretation: It allows for the second possibility above as the 
description of the current relation between the two capacities, but it also 
hypothesizes on the origins of this relation. Therefore, but also because it is an 
attractive hypothesis, this interpretation receives a more extensive discussion in 
this section. 
 Different cognitive capacities have been suggested as the possible 
immediate origins of the complex computational patterns found in natural 
language, in the arithmetic capacity and in other sophisticated human cognitive 
capacities. Among them are the vocal production (Carstairs–McCarthy 1999), 
social cognition (Bickerton 1998), motorics (Jarvis 2007), and navigation (Bartlett 
& Kazakov 2005). In the remaining part of this section, I consider arguments in 
favor of spatial computation as a better candidate.  
 Virtually all animals, and even some plants, show some sort of sensitivity 
to aspects of space. Whenever this sensitivity is not a matter of a direct physical 
reaction, but requires the mediation of some biological process, it may be 
considered to involve computation. Hence, it is reasonable to think that spatial 
computation preceded any other kind of cognitive computation in animals. 
Moreover, it is a prominent possibility that other types of computation 
developed through the process of broadening, or shifting, the domain of 
application of the spatial computation, and of its gradual, or perhaps at times 
abrupt, sophistication. This is to say that all the types of computation that can be 
observed in animals today stem from the original purely spatial computation, 
which emerged very early in the animal evolution line. 
 Arguments in favor of this view are numerous. First, most other domains 
in which computation applies either can be seen as essentially spatial, or can be 
seen as metaphorically subjecting non-spatial data to spatial computation. 
Among the essentially spatial ones are the vision, the navigation and the 
motorics. Some others, like the cognition of time, planning, and language, 
involve such a high degree of spatial computations at each level, that they can 
easily be seen as originating from the spatial domain.  
 Apart from the similarities presented in section 4, there are many other 
spatial borrowings in the structures and computations involved in language. 
Even the metaphors used to talk about grammar are predominantly spatial. In 
phonology, an important role is played by the linearity of structures involved 
and by notions such as distance or adjacency, which are all essentially spatial. In 
syntax, again, there are syntactic trees, feature geometries, locality relations, 
movements, unifications, and so on. In semantics, operators have scope, variables 
get bound, predicates are bounded (e.g., with an upper bound), homogeneous, or 
scalar; even our intuitions about sets and quantification rely on spatial concepts. 
This not only illustrates the suitability of spatial relations in the theoretical 
modeling of grammar, but also suggests the possibility that the target of this 
modeling borrows a number of essentially spatial computational and structural 
patterns. 
 But more importantly, there are similar connections at the level of content. 
In lexical semantics, one can observe that for instance all prepositions, including 
the temporal ones, usually stem from words that had spatial meanings (see 
Lakoff & Johnson 1980 for the lexical semantic, but also for the general cognitive 
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status of spatial concepts). Other classes show similar, although usually less 
strong, relatedness to spatial meanings.  
 A second aspect in favor of the view that language has evolved from spatial 
cognition capacity comes from brain science. Jarvis (2007) reports about a series 
of experiments on different animal species with considerably complex 
computational capacity in the domain of vocal production. Their insights go in 
the direction of the generalization that brain centers engaged in vocal production 
in all the examined species are directly related to the brain centers engaged in 
motoric activities. The authors speculate that the former developed from the 
latter, by processes of specialization and adaptation to different tasks. Even the 
shapes and positions of the brain centers involved strongly suggest this 
conclusion: The brain center engaged in vocal production is either located within 
that engaged in motorics, or looks like its translated copy (i.e. it is located in the 
immediate vicinity and has approximately the same shape). It is very difficult to 
separate the centers engaged in motorics from those involved in spatial 
cognition. The entire motoric system has developed for functions directly related 
to space. Every activation of the motoric system has direct effects only in the 
spatio-temporal domain, and it is in space and time that they lead to the possible 
further effects, which achieve their actual function. Every possible function of an 
activity of the motoric system is a function from certain spatial relations. Jarvis 
reports about experiments designed to exclude the possibility that the activated 
centers are those engaged in navigation, and involved in the control of the 
motoric activities. However, navigation is only one specialized type of spatial 
computation and even a successful isolation of the navigation centers from the 
experiment does not mean the isolation of all aspects of spatial computation. In 
fact, conceptual considerations quite strongly suggest that no experiment can 
investigate the motoric cognition in full isolation from any aspects of spatial 
cognition, because the former does not exist without the latter. If Jarvis is right 
that at least some special types of computation, such as those of vocal production 
and learning, evolved from spatial cognition, by its extension into a particular 
non-spatial domain, then it is a prominent possibility that a change of the same 
type, but involving a larger number of domains, lead to the emergence of 
language. Consecutive development and adaptation of the newly emerged 
capacity lead to the language faculty as we have it today. 
 A third argument comes from an intriguing speculation by Krifka (2007), 
who argues that the subject–predicate, or topic–comment relation, which is 
central for the human language faculty, originates from the human property of 
handedness: the specialization of one hand for slow, heavy, rough tasks, and of 
the other for precise, quick, light tasks. In essence, this is an argument that a core 
property of language (but also of vision as a figure-ground distinction between 
the focused and the non-focused part) is argued to originate from an essentially 
spatially realized property of the cognition involved in motorics. 
 Pushing the hypothesis further, we may offer the following answers to 
some interesting questions of evolution of language. Language has evolved from 
spatial computation. The important changes that channeled this process are the 
following:  
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(i) the extension of the spatial computation into non-spatial domains 
leading to a domain-general use of the computation; 
(ii) the serialization of the descriptive and geometrical domains, 
generalizing a sequence that specifies both the description and the 
geometric properties of a place, i.e. referent; 
(iii) the increasing functionality of a group update of the mental 
representations involved, mediated (or even pushed) by the 
development of phonological/ phonetic modules.9 
 
Note that (i) and (ii) are well facilitated by the expansion of the number of 
categories. Principles of economy lead to the development of complex translation 
and (de-)compression procedures between segments from the discourse and 
phonological structures. In this view, syntax is to be divided into two systems: 
one, the ‘conceptual syntax’, determining the structure of (the concept specifying) 
the descriptive and geometric components of a discourse referent (close to the 
notion of conceptual semantic structures of Jackendoff 1999), and the other, the 
‘translation syntax’, specifying the translation and (de-)compression rules 
between the structures generated by the ‘conceptual syntax’ and the 
corresponding phonological structures. Only one of the two, the ‘conceptual 
syntax’, is generative (engaged in producing and interpreting structures), while 
the other is only translational (interface computations). The former developed 
together with the development of spatial cognition capacity and its extension to 
other domains, while the latter is part of the development of language, and in 
particular of phonology.10 
 Out of the three important changes above, only the first one, the step of 
extending the spatial computation to a domain-general use, presents a qualitative 
change, which might have happened relatively abruptly, i.e. within a relatively 
short period of time, and a relatively small number of generations. Yet, it is 
equally possible that this change was gradual, originally involving an import of 
some pseudo-spatial concepts into the spatial domain, and then of the less spatial 
ones, until the full disappearance of domain boundaries for the application of 
spatial computation procedures. In any case, it may be a consequence of a fairly 
simple genetic change, or possibly just a cultural development: a series of 
breakthroughs of individuals incorporated into the culture and acquired by the 
entire community (due to its special organizational properties). The other two 
                                                
    9 Originally, a group update could have emerged when the situation in which a change in the 
immediate context was perceived by a group of individuals was utilized and became a part 
of the cultural load of a group, triggering some theory of mind effects in the individuals 
from the group. The next step is the emergence of behavioural strategies to trigger a group 
update in a controlled fashion, which became more and more systematic, and more and 
more phonological. The present view has nothing to say about whether this process was 
pushed by the group update or by some already existing system of vocal production and 
learning. 
    10 ‘Conceptual syntax’ is involved in the generation of every non-atomic concept. This is not to 
say that every time we use a complex concept, we generate it from scratch. More frequent 
complex concepts are stored in the memory, and can be used without generation. 
Sometimes they are also associated with phonological material, whether single morphemes 
or complex constructions. 
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changes are more likely to have been gradual, possibly driven by probabilistic 
changes and rounds of reanalysis. The serialization of the descriptive and 
geometric components might have kicked off as a product of the planning 
capacity, aimed to guarantee efficiency in navigation, which was generalized 
during a period of time, eventually becoming part of the computational 
procedure. The group update of the spatial context representation, and later 
discourse, is another phenomenon which exists in a number of animal species 
(e.g., the coordinated hunting strategies of some dolphin species or the food-
caching jays discussed in Gallistel, in press), but as domain-specific.11 Its extent in 
the behavior of humans differs from that in animals in a number of properties, 
such as for instance involving a complex and sophisticated intentionality. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The contribution pointed out some striking parallels between cognitive maps and 
the language faculty, from their architectures, to the role of categories, to 
reference, but also some interesting differences between the two capacities. The 
article concentrates on the possible explanations for the presented facts, paying a 
special attention to the possibility that language has evolved from spatial 
cognition by the switch of the genuinely spatial computation involved — to a 
domain-general use. Although the present view of the evolution of language is 
highly speculative, it presents a hypothesis that deserves serious consideration. 
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